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Unforeseen events early in 1980 have increased un-
certainty about the Ninth District economy over the 
rest of the year. Farm income fell, interest rates rose to 
record levels, a credit control program was imposed, 
and the nation apparently entered the long-awaited 
recession. While these events have made us less confi-
dent than before about the outlook for the district, our 
forecasting model still predicts that it will avoid a 
recession, and that prediction still seems plausible.* 
Last Forecast: No Recession, High Inflation 
Last winter we predicted that, despite the embargo on 
selling grain to the U.S.S.R., farmers would help the 
district stay out of a recession. Government programs 
appeared to be nullifying the embargo's impact, and 
by late January, grain prices had returned to their 
preembargo levels. Consequently, we expected farm 
output and income to be about the same in 1980 as 
the year before. In addition, various indicators of the 
national economy looked positive at the time of the last 
forecast. The homebuilding industry had just received 
an influx of new mortgage funds, thanks to a new 
government ruling which allowed financial firms to 
offer money market certificates to small savers. Be-
sides, output was still growing, and many new jobs 
were available. Thus, our model forecast 2 percent 
growth in district employment, accompanied by 13 
percent inflation. 
This spring our model is still giving us the same 
prediction. While unexpected recent developments 
*Using employment growth as a proxy for economic growth, our winter 
Quarterly Review forecast no recession for the Ninth District. A commonly 
used rule of thumb for a national recession is two consecutive quarters of 
decline in real gross national product (GNP), the total of all goods and services 
produced by the economy. But a comparable measure of production is not 
available for the district. To estimate it, we have to use an important input 
measure —employment —and assume that changes in this measure roughly 
correspond to changes in output. The Ninth Federal Reserve District consists 
of Minnesota, Montana, North and South Dakota, northwestern Wisconsin, 
and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. 
have made a recession seem more likely, the model 
still could be right. 
Farm Income Down, Interest Rates Up 
One unexpected development is that farm income 
has fallen from a year ago. Farmers intend to plant 
4 percent more acres this spring than last, but our 
earlier forecast of farm income nevertheless appears to 
be optimistic. While the government continued its 
efforts to nullify the impact of the grain embargo, in 
April market factors pushed grain prices below their 
preembargo levels again. In addition, farm produc-
tion costs increased 6 percent between December 
and April. With prices decreasing and costs increasing, 
56 percent of the rural bankers responding to our April 
survey reported their areas' farm income down from a 
year ago, nearly twice as large a share as said that 
three months earlier. 
While the drop in farm income is not encouraging 
for the regional economy, past history suggests that the 
government will step in with higher price supports or 
other help if the drop continues. For this reason, our 
model's forecast of no recession in the district looks 
attainable in spite of the decline in farm income. 
Another unexpected development is that inter-
est rates have been much higher than predicted. Our 
forecasting model, along with most experts, expected 
interest rates to remain at their December levels, but 
instead they rose to record levels in the first quarter, 
the prime rate reaching 20 percent. These higher rates 
have reduced lending. If prices had risen as rapidly as 
interest rates, lending might not have been affected, for 
borrowers could have passed on the higher interest 
costs. But interest costs for many merchants rose faster 
than the prices of their merchandise, so they cut back 
on their borrowing to help maintain their profitability. 
Furthermore, in states where usury ceilings kept inter-
est rates from rising, lending became so unprofitable 
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interest rates could not get loans. As a result, usury 
ceilings, which were already restricting consumer lend-
ing late last year, reduced lending even further when 
interest rates rose sharply in the first quarter. 
Like the drop in farm income, this reduction in 
lending is not encouraging for the district's economic 
outlook, but fortunately there are signs that it will be 
short-lived. Interest rates have plummeted in recent 
weeks, which should help create more normal lending 
patterns and should allow loans to be made within the 
limits of the existing usury laws. For this reason, the 
unexpected fall in lending may not invalidate our 
model's forecast of no recession in the district. 
Credit Controls Imposed—and Loosened 
A third unexpected development is the federal govern-
ment's credit allocation program, begun on March 14. 
The Federal Reserve System placed voluntary limits 
on how fast banks could expand their lending and 
established several new reserve requirements to dis-
courage other types of credit and the use of money 
market mutual funds. 
Considerable uncertainty exists about the pro-
gram's impact. It may have lowered inflation by reduc-
ing people's ability to borrow. If people now want to 
hold more cash in order to meet their outlays, then with 
a given amount of money in the economy spending 
must be lower than it would have been without the 
program and price increases must be somewhat slower. 
But the program could easily have lowered output 
along with spending by making the marketplace less 
efficient. In our economy interest rates, like other 
prices, tend to allocate goods and services to their most 
productive uses. Under credit controls, banks cannot 
always make loans to the industries and people that 
can use them in the most profitable way. The economy, 
therefore, cannot produce the most desirable mix of 
goods and services. The requirement that bank loans 
must grow 9 percent or less, even though banks must 
continue to make normal amounts of credit available 
to farmers, small businesses, and home buyers, for 
example, could deprive an efficient large company of 
funds, while a less efficient small company could get 
more than it normally would. 
We do not know what the program's actual impact 
has been, so we have no way of adjusting our model's 
forecast to reflect it. Clearly, this makes the forecast 
less certain. Credit controls have been reduced recent-
ly, however, and some think they may be eliminated 
soon. Thus the impact of this program on the regional 
economy should not be substantial enough to produce 
a recession. 
Nationwide Recession Deeper Than Expected 
The final unexpected event is the apparent arrival of 
a deeper nationwide recession than our model had 
anticipated. The model's original forecast was based 
on the assumption that, at most, a very mild recession 
would hit the nation in 1980. But in March the 
Commerce Department's composite index of leading 
indicators declined 2.6 percent, the third largest de-
cline in its history. Then, in April, industrial produc-
tion had its sharpest drop in five years, and the number 
of housing units started fell to its lowest level in five 
years. This probably means that the nation's recession 
has already begun and that it will be more severe than 
expected. 
While a nationwide recession does not help the 
district's economic growth, it does not necessarily 
produce a recession in the district. Typically, because 
of its industrial diversity, the district runs ahead of 
the national average during a slowdown. During one 
year in the last recession, for instance, U.S. employ-
ment fell more than 1 percent but Ninth District 
employment was virtually unchanged. Because of that 
relatively good track record, the model's forecast for 
the district still appears reasonable. 
Our Model's New Forecast: Same as the Old 
The drop in farm income, the rise in interest rates, the 
imposition of credit controls, and the nationwide reces-
sion have made our model's forecast more uncertain 
and have increased the odds of a recession in the 
district; however, our regional forecasting model has so 
far given very accurate predictions in spite of the 
turbulence of the economy. In the first quarter, for 
instance, compared to a year earlier, district employ-
ment increased 2.5 percent and Minneapolis-St. Paul 
consumer prices increased 12.3 percent, just as the 
model predicted. When the model was rerun using 
first-quarter data, it still projected 2 percent growth in 
employment and 13 percent inflation for 1980. All 
things considered, this remains a plausible forecast, but 
the uncertainty about economic activity has, of course, 
made economic forecasting a very risky venture. 
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